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THE REGULATION OF MANAGEMENT INVESTMENT
TRUSTS FOR THE "PROTECTION OF INVESTORS
SECTION 30 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 author-
ized the Securities and Exchange Commission to investigate investment
trusts and report its findings and recommendations to Congress.1 After more
than a year of study, the Chairman of the Commission stated in a letter
transmitting the preliminary report to Congress that the Commission was
convinced of a need for comprehensive legislation to protect investors and
to prevent socially undesirable control of other corporations by investment
trusts.2 In the light of the probabilities of such legislation, this comment
will discuss that phase of the problem which concerns the protection of in-
vestors.
The name investment trust has been used loosely to designate many types
of organizations formed for the purpose of investing funds of numerous
participants in a diversified group of securities. The term originated in
England in the middle of the 19th century when the first investment trusts
were organized as common law trusts.3 Subsequent to the passage of the
Companies Act in 1862, British investment trusts were generally organized
as limited companies.4 After the financial depression during the 1890's, these
investment trusts have, for the most part, been conservatively and success-
fully operated with no regulation other than by the Companies Act.5 There
are now over two hundred companies with a combined capital of some three
hundred million pounds.6 Typically, the British company has a capital struc-
ture of junior and senior securities. The proceeds of the sale of these securi-
1. 49 STAT. 837 (1935), 15 U. S. C. §79z-4 (Supp. 1936). "The commission is
authorized and directed to make a study of the functions and activities of investment
tiusts and iivestment companies, the corporate structures, and investment palicies of
such trusts and companies, the influence exerted by such trusts and companies upon
companies in which they are interested, and the influence exerted by interests affiliated
with the management of such trusts and companies upon their investment policies and
to report the results of its study and its recommendations to the Congress on or before
January 4, 1937."
2. S. E. C., Preliminary Summary of the Progress of the Study of Investment
Trusts and Investment Companies (Jan. 8, 1937) ii. The scope of the study is broad
and inclusive. The information and material used in the study have been prepared
through the medium of specially prepared questionnaires, preliminary discussions and
conferences with representatives of investment trusts, field studies and public exam-
inations.
3. See generally Sykes v. Beadon, 11 Ch. D. 170 (1879) ; Smith v. Anderson, 15
Ch. D. 247 (1880); ROBINSON, INVESTMENT TRUST OoANIZATION AND N :AGEU.NT
(rev. ed. 1929) 9. The genesis of the British investment trusts seems to have occurred
in Belgium in 1822. GRAYsox, INVESTMENT TRUSTS (1928) 11.
4. GL'LYSON, INVESTMIENT TRUSTS (1928) 22.
5. DURST, ANALYSIS AND HANDBOOK or INVESTMENT Timsmrs (1932) 7; GRAYsoN,
INVESTMENT TRUSTS (1928) 15, 31.
6. Inzestment Trust Groups, (Sept. 26, 1936) 124 TnE Eco-o.iisT 567.
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ties are invested in a widely diversified portfolio of bonds, preferred stocks
and common stocks. The management, for reasonable compensation, con-
tinuously supervises the portfolio and has complete control of the invest-
ments. Ultra conservative accounting methods are used so that large reserves,
both apparent and hidden, are kept as a safeguard against periods of business
depression.
7
In contrast to the slow, conservative, and stereotyped growth of invest-
ment trusts in Great Britain, their rise in this country has been recent,
meteoric, and confused. From insignificance before 1924,8 the movement
recruited hundreds of organizations controlling assets estimated at more than
six and a half billion dollars before the market crash in 1929,' with more
than half of the growth taking place after 1927.10 This phenomenal develop-
ment which made investment trusts almost as large in size as building and
loan associations," over a third as large as life insurance companies 12 and
over a half as large as savings banks' 3 as investors of the public's money, was
due not only to the avid desire of the public for securities in the boom era'4
but also to an apparently genuine demand for the distribution of risk and
skilled management not otherwise available to the small investor.'0
This comment will be concerned primarily with the "management type"
trusts 16 which form about 70% in number and probably even a greater per-
centage in amount of assets of the investment trusts in this country. These
are generally private corporations following to some extent the conventional
British plan.17 The capital structure usually consists of junior and senior
equities and, less often, debentures.' 8 A great many are sponsored by invest-
7. ROBINSON, op. cit. supra note 3, at 7; OTrNGEa AND SHEA, A SURVEY OF THE
AcTmTIES AND FORMS OF INVESTMENT TRUSTS WITH RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STATUTORY
REGULATION BY THE NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF LAW (1927) 6.
8. S. E. C., op. cit. supra note 2, at 7.
9. S. E. C., op. cit. supra note 2, at 7. Cf. KEANE, MANUAL OF INVESTMENT TRUSTS
(1932) ii.
10. In 1928 and 1929 at least $2,500,000,000 worth of investment trusts securities
were issued. KEANE, loc. cit. supra note 9. About a quarter of the corporate financing
in the United States in 1929 was done by investment trusts and holding companies. STA-
TISTICAL ASTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES (U. S. Dep't Commerce 1936) 293.
11. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES (U. S. Dep't of Commerce, 1936)
257.
12. Id. at 282.
13. Id. at 243. One banker claimed that savings banks had lost about a billion dol-
lars of potential deposits because of the rise of investment trusts, N. Y. Times, Mar.
24, 1928. p. 23, col. 1.
14. See N. Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1929, p. 9, col. 2.
15. ROBINSON, op. cit. supra note 3, at 3.
16. S. E. C., op. cit. supra note 2, at 7.
17. Some are organized as business trusts. OTTINGER AND SHEA, op. cit. supra note
7, at 19.
18. Shaviro, The Regulation of Investment Trusts: What the S. E. C. Will Prob-
ably Recommend (1936) 48 ANNALIST 454. The issuance of debentures by British in-
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ment banking firms, brokerage houses, and other financial institutions. 9
The majority are formed for the ostensible purpose of investing funds in a
widely diversified portfolio of securities and grant unlimited powers to their
directors in the control of the portfolio.20 Some, however, have been formed
to invest in a single industry 2 ' or to profit by trading in securities rather
than by conservative investing.Y Other enterprises, nominally investment
trusts, operate as holding companies3- the uncertain distinction between
investment trusts and holding companies depending upon whether the pur-
chasing of securities is for investment or managerial purposes.2 Another
type of management investment trust is the "open end" or "mutual" trust
which permits the holder at his option to redeem his security at the asset
value minus a withdrawal charge.25 The only useful generalization that can
be made concerning management investment trusts is that they include all
investment companies which give their management a considerable discretion
as to investment policy.
Lack of confidence in managerial capacity, particularly following the mar-
ket crash, gave rise to what is known as the fixed or semi-fixed investment
trusts2 0 which constitute 25,% of the total number..2 7 In these trusts the
sponsor deposits with the trustee under a trust indenture a certain diversified
group of securities called a unit. Against this unit the trustee issues par-
ticipation certificates which the sponsor sells to the public. In the fixed trust
the composition of the unit remains unchanged during the duration of the
trust, but in the semi-fixed trust provisions for release and substitution
in the indenture may give the sponsor either a limited or an almost com-
plete managerial control.3 The other 5% of the total number of investment
trusts consist of special investment plans involving installment payments.2 9
vestment trusts is practically universal. OrNGrnE AND SHEA. op. cit. supra note 7,
at 20.
19. OrIxcR A D SHEA, op. cit. mtpra note 7, at 10; Ronj:.so:;, op. cit. sulra note
3, at 21.
20. OTTiNG.ER AD SHEA, op. cit. supra note 7, at 77.
21. Id. at 76.
22. Id. at 79.
23. Id. at 131; SEN. REz. No. 1455. 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) 360.
24. SEN. RE. op. cit. supra note 23, at 363. Part of the purpose of the investiga-
tion of the Securities and Exchange Commission is to determine the control exercised
by so-called investment trusts over the companies in which it holds stock. See note 1
suPra.
25. S. E. C.. op. cit. -supra note 2, at 3.
26. Fixed and Flexible Trusts, A Surzeey (Mar. 7, 1936. supp.) 122 THE Ecox-
OMIST 1.
27. S. E. C., op. cit. supra note 2, at 7.
28. See generally RoBassox, op. cit. mtpra note 3, at 49 el seq.; Myers, Fixed In-
vestment Trusts-Sone Observations (1929) 4 ST. JoHres L Rnv. 1; Fixed and Flex-
ible Trusts, A Survey (Mar. 7, 1936, supp.) 122 THE EcoNOMIsr 1. The abuses of fixed
trusts have led to proposals for regulation in England. The Fixed Trust Report (Aug.
15, 1936) !24 THE Ecoxo.isr 311.
2). S. E. C., op. cit. mipra note 2, at 7.
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In spite of warnings before the crash in 1929, investors were purchasing
the securities of management investment trusts at prices which were far
above the actual book values of the securities held by the trust as its assets.
Since these were in turn based upon portfolios purchased at inflated prices,3 0
it is not surprising that holders of investment trust securities were among
the chief sufferers in the deflation after 1929. When the bottom of the
market was reached in 1932, the total assets (market value of the securities
held by investment trusts) had shrunk from six and a half billion dollars
to one and a half billion.3 1 This tremendous shrinkage was intensified by
the abuses which had become prevalent during the rapid and unrestrained
growth of investment trusts. The prevalence of these abuses in the organ-
ization and administration of investment trusts will not be known in detail
until the Securities and Exchange Commission has made its final report.
While it is clear that many investment trusts have been, either completely
or to a large extent, free from these malpractices, the evidence already avail-
able shows that in more than a few isolated cases the investment trust field
has been a playground for incompetent and unscrupulous managers and pro-
moters. The abuses which have arisen with respect to the management type
of investment trust concern both the original promotion and subsequent
management.
The most frequently condemned practice arising in the course of promo-
tion is the taking of profits and control by the promotors grossly dispropor-
tionate to their contribution of capital.3 2 Another criticism has been directed
at the breadth of the charter provisions which grant unlimited powers to
management 3 3 and seek to absolve the management from liability to stock-
holders.3 4 Investment trusts have also been criticized for inadequate dis-
30. In a report to the convention of the Investment Bankers Association such a
warning was given. The report stated that: "It is possible that if such losses become
widespread there will be renewed agitation for regulation by state and federal authori-
ties." N. Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1929, p. 9, col. 2. In an editorial it was said that "no one
in touch with the ideas of Wall St. can have missed the prevalent impression that the
stock market's recent activities have been associated with the immensely increased re-
sources of the investment trusts". N. Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1929, § 3, p. 4, col. 2.
31. S. E. C. op. cit. supra note 2, at 7.
32. This may be accomplished by the use of several classes of stock, option war-
rants, or management contracts. FLYNN, INVESTMENT TRUSTS GONE WRONGo (1931) 33;
SEN. REP. op. cit. supra note 23, at 339; Record, Public Examination of General Amer-
ican Investors Co., Inc., by the S. E. C. held in conjunction with the investment trust
study (Nov. 12, 1936) 5730. Citations to this record will hereafter be referred to merely
as the Record, followed by the name of the investment trust examined. This public
examination has been reported almost daily by the N. Y. Times from the time the hear-
ings commenced in July, 1936.
33. Record, Spencer Trask Fund, Inc. (Sept. 30, 1936) 3164.
34. Record, Spencer Trask Fund, Inc. (Sept. 30, 1936) 3150; Record, Liberty Share
Corp. (Dec. 29, 1936) 8942. A similar clause is set out in SEN. REP. op. cit. supra note
23, at 353. "In case the corporation enters into contracts or transacts business with one
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closure of relevant facts to the investing public in the original sale of
securities "m and consequent confusion of the public as to the risks involved
in the purchase of their securities. In general, investment trusts represent
themselves to the public as semi-conservative investment mediums, almost
never as agencies through which an investor can gamble on the skill or luck
of the speculator-manager to whom he entrusts his funds; the advertising
of many trusts has been composed with the intent of conveying an impression
of super-conservative investment skill, and all kinds of investment trusts
from obviously speculative to ultra conservative investment companies have
used the misleading and impressive label "investment trust":3 0
Criticism of the management of investment trusts has been directed toward
the lack of disclosure to the investing public of earnings and investments,37
and misleading financial statements resulting from the lack of standard ac-
counting methods.38  Other practices open to attack are the acquisition of
highly speculative rather than dividend paying stocks,3 9 the excessive con-
centration of investments in one or a few companies 40 -particularly for the
purposes of control rather than investment,41 excessive trading, speculating 42
short selling, borrowing and lending money,43 and the participation of in-
or more of its directors, or with any firm of which one or more of its directors are
members, or with any other corporation or association of which one or more of its
directors are stockholders, directors, or officers, such contract or transaction shall not
be invalidated or in any wise affected by the fact that such director or directors doing
it mav have interests therein which are or might be adverse to the interests of this cor-
poration, even though the vote of the director or directors having such adverse interest
shall have been necessary to obligate the corporation upon such contract or transaction.
No such director or directors shall be liable to the corporation, or to any stockholder or
creditor thereof, or to any other person, for any loss incurred by it under or by reason
of such contract or transaction, nor shall such director or directors be accountable for
any gain or profits realized thereon."
35. Excerpt from Attorney General Bennett's report to the N. Y. state legislature
on Mar. 5, 1936. KFLAsE, MANUAL OF INVESTElxNT TiusTs, (1932) 1755.
36. In a report of the investment trust committee of the Investment Bankers' Asso-
ciation it was said: "The Committee are of the opinion that there has been a good deal
of general misunderstanding which is no doubt due to a large extent to the title 'invest-
ment trust' really a misnomer." N. Y. Times, July 3, 1928, p. 32, col. 2. See also Orrill-
G AND SnEA, op. cit. supra note 7, at 8; Record, Mayflower Associates, Inc. (Oct.
13, 1936) 3690.
37. Bennett, loc. cit. supra note 35; SEN. REP. op. cat. supra note 23, at 363; Record,
Liberty Share Corp. (Dec. 29, 1936) 9000.
38. Record, Liberty Share Corp. (Dec. 29, 1936) 9039.
39. SEN. REP. op. cit. supra note 23, at 343.
40. SEN. RFP. op. cit. supra note 23, at 348. Record, Petroleum Corp. of America
(Sept. 28, 1936) 2856.
41. SE,. RPp., op. cit. supra note 23, at 359.
42. Bennett, loc. cit. supra note 35; Record, Equity Corp. (Aug. 3, 1936) 934; Rec-
ord, Liberty Share Corp. (Dec. 29, 1936) 9027.
43. OrrNGER, AND SHA, op. cit. supra note 7, at 21; Bennett, loc. cit. sup-ra note
35; Record, Liberty Share Corp. (Dec. 29, 1936) 8899.
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vestment trusts in the underwriting of new securities 44 or in trading ac-
counts.45 Perhaps, the most serious criticism, however, has involved the
abuses by managers resulting from conflicts between their own interests and
their duty toward the investors. The conflicts arise because investment trusts
are often sponsored or controlled by banks, investment banking houses,
brokerage concerns or other investment trusts. They are manifested in
various ways: the participation of investment trusts in underwritings in
which the controlling investment bank is interested; 40 the use of an invest-
ment trust as a dumping ground for unmarketable securities;47 the unnec-
cessarily frequent substitution in the portfolio for the purpose of obtaining
commissions for the brokerage house which controls it ;48 sales and purchases
of securities to and from sponsors, officers, and directors; 49 loans to officers
and directors;5° the control of one investment trust by another to permit
transactions between the two resulting in injury to one."
A recent case will serve to illustrate the manner in which the interests
of security holders in an investment trust may be abused. 2 In 1928 a
brokerage house, controlled and operated by two men, organized an invest-
ment trust. It was incorporated with an authorized capital of 32,000 shares
of Class A 7% voting preferred stock with a par value of $25 a share and
2,000 shares of Class B no par common stock with equal voting power per
share. The common stock was immediately voted to the brokerage house as
compensation for services in promoting the corporation. A resolution was
then passed which gave the brokerage house a five-year option to purchase at
$25.00 per share all of the Class A stock and provided that the brokerage
house was to be the sole selling agent of all the preferred stock upon which
they did not exercise their option. By this arrangement the brokerage house
was in a position to control the investment trust. A number of prominent
44. Record, Spencer Trask Fund, Inc. (Sept. 30, 1936) 3166; Record, Lehman Corp.
(Nov. 10, 1936) 5554.
45. Record, Spencer Trask Fund, Inc. (Sept. 30, 1936) 3173; Liberty Share Corp.
(Dec. 29, 1936) 8900.
46. See, e.g., Record, Lehman Corp. (Nov. 10, 1936) 5554.
47. Bennett, loc. cit. supra note 35; SEN. REP., op. cit. supra note 23, at 351; FLYNN,
op. cit. supra note 32, at 52; Record, Prince & Whitely Trading Corp. (Jan. 7, 1937)
9477.
48. SEN. REP., op. cit. supra note 23, at 362.
49. Record, Liberty Share Corp. (Dec. 30, 1936) 9144.
50. Bennett, loc. cit. supra note 35; Record, Liberty Share Corp. (Dec. 29, 1936)
8905.
51. Record, Equity Corp. (July 31, 1936) 839. The abuses are similar to those
which arose in connection with public utility holding companies such as pyramiding and
intercompany manipulations. See Comment (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 468, 474. Certain so-
called investment trusts are within the scope of the Public Utility Holding Company
Act of 1935. 49 STAT. 804 (1935), 15 U. S. C., § 79b (Supp. 1936).
52. O'Connor v. First Nat. Investors' Corporation of Virginia, 163 Va. 908, 177
S. E. 852 (1935).
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men were elected as directors. On the strength of their names 4,000 shares
of the preferred stock were sold to the public at $25.00 a share. The board
of directors was inactive and the trust was operated by the brokerage house
which had, therefore, complete control of $100,000 of the investors' money
without having contributed any cash whatsoever. The brokerage house thus
had everything to win, both through the option on the preferred stock and
ownership of the common, for the brokerage house could either gamble with
the assets or employ them in its own business. On the other hand, it had
little to lose should the enterprise prove unsuccessful. From its formation
until July, 1931, when persistent rumors of the financial difficulties of the
brokerage house led to an investigation, the operations of the trust were
unknown even to most of the directors. The investigation disclosed, among
other instances of gross mismanagement, that the brokerage house had sold
over-valued and even worthless stock to the investment trust; that the
brokerage house had borrowed money and securities from the investment
trust without authorization; and that the value of its assets was reduced
from $100,000 to $20,000.
53
Such losses to investors after 1929, caused in part by the abuses disclosed,
have already resulted in a limited amount of public control and in demand
for more extensive regulation. As early as 1927 it was recognized that
investment trusts, often represented as conservative and responsible invest-
ment institutions, were proper subjects for stricter regulation than ordinary
commercial and industrial corporations, r  since they are entrusted with the
responsibility of investing other people's money in securities which are easily
transferable, and hence offer large temptations to unscrupulous managerscu
Before discussing the existing regulation and problems arising from pro-
posals for further control, it will be necessary to consider separately two
broad categories of such regulation. The first is regulation by means of pub-
licity, the theory underlying the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange
Act; the second is more affirmative regulation by supervision of the actual
management of the trusts.
There is general agreement, even among the investment trusts themselves,
that full disclosure of the promotion and management of investment trusts
would be desirableY6 Such publicity has already been accomplished to a
53. The court held that the "dummy" directors were liable to stockholders for
breach of the fiduciary duty. O'Connor v. First Nat. Investors' Corporation of Virginia,
163 Va. 908, 177 S. E. 852 (1935).
54. "The history of all State regulation shows that there is a tendency on the part
of the people to permit individual enterprise to flourish until some great public evil or
catastrophe occurs and then restrictive and drastic legislation is made effective, locking
the barn door after the horse has been stolen." OrriNGER AND SHEA, op. ei. supra note
7, at 100.
55. See Goodwin v. Simpson, 197 N. E. 628, 630 (Mass. 1935); O'Connor v. First
Nat. Investors' Corporation of Virginia, 163 Va. 908, 926, 177 S. _. 852, 860 (1935).
56. Among those who have recommended such legislation are: Otto H. Kahn, SE:;.
RFP., op. cit. sitpra note 23, at 363; Paul C. Cabot, Record, State Street Investment
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considerable extent, particularly with reference to the original sale of secur-
ities to the public. The Federal Securities Act 57 is of course the most far-
reaching means of forcing full disclosure of the organization and promotion
of investment trusts in the original sale of securities to the public. While
no specialized form for information has yet been adopted, 58 a study of regis-
tration statements, which were ineffective because of withdrawal, refusal,
or stop orders, disclosed such abuses as pyramiding, exorbitant profits and
control to promoters, conflicting interests and unreliability of the sponsors.59
Also, a number of states have adopted, in the form of Blue-Sky law rules
and regulations, 60 the recommendations of the National Association of Secur-
ities Commissioners concerning special information necessary for investors
in investment trusts.(' This information includes the number of shares of
each class of stock held by directors and officers and the cash consideration
paid for such shares; the class of stock having voting power and the names
of those who own and control it; financial statements and the contents of
the portfolio classified by kinds of securities, industries, and countries; the
connection of the investment trust to its investment house or banking insti-
tution and the circumstances under which these latter institutions may deal
with the investment trust; the transactions between the investment trust and
officers and directors; the policies of investment and of supplying informa-
tion to its stockholders. At least two states require detailed evidence of the
character and competency of the management and a confidential disclosure
of the complete contents of the portfolio. Finally, special information is
required by the New York Stock Exchange as a prerequisite to the original
listing of securities of investment trusts. '2 This includes disclosure of the
relationship of the management to other institutions, operating experience,
organization expenses, loans, commissions, non-voting stock, financial state-
ments and portfolio.
It would seem, therefore, that information concerning the original promotion
and organization has been made readily available to investors. Most of the
conspicuous abuses have occurred, however, in the subsequent operation
Corp. of Boston (Sept. 23, 1936) 2784; H. M. Minton, Record, Spencer Trask Fund,
Inc. (Sept. 30, 1936) 3205; R. D. McGrath, Record. General American Investors Co.
(Nov. 12, 1936) 5842; Robert Lehman, Record, Lehman Corp. (Nov. 10, 1936) 5652;
L. W. Schmidt, Record, Administrative and Research Corp. (Jan. 28, 1937) 11418.
57. 48 STAT. 74 (1933), 15 U. S. C. § 77a (1934).
58. 131 C. C. H. Stocks and Bonds Law Serv. (1936) 12621.
59. Cale, A Study of Ineffective Investment Trusts and Pj'ecious Metal AfMining
Issues (1937) 4 LAW AND CONTEmrORARY PROBE is 32, 37.
60. 131 C. C. H. Stocks and Bonds Law Serv. (1936) Maine, 1785; Missouri, 2395;
New Hampshire, 2777; New Mexico, 2975; North Dakota, 3282; Oklahoma, 3483; Ver-
mont, 4380; West Virginia, 4684.
61. Robinson, op. cit. supra note 3, at 572.
62. New York Stock Exchange special requirement for listing investment trust
securities approved by committee on stock list, June 6, 1929, as amended to April, 1931.
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and management of the investment trust, matters on which the investor has
been most completely uninformed, for state Blue-Sky laws and the Federal
Securities Act are limited in their operation to the original distribution of
securities. Except where the investment trust is classified as a financial
institution and is therefore subject to periodic examinations by state officials
and forced to make frequent disclosure to stockholders,Oa no special require-
ments for disclosure under state laws exist. But under the Federal Securities
Exchange Act of 1934,G4 the Commission can compel all investment trusts
seeking registration on national security exchanges not only to make original
disclosure, but to keep such information up to date.a ,Moreuver, any in-
vestment trust not listed on a security exchange which nevertheless seeks
registration under the Securities Act of 1933 must agree to furnish such
subsequent periodic information. 6 Special forms have been adopted by the
Commission for investment trusts including not only detailed financial state-
ment but information as to management and control, policies, remuneration,
and sales of securities. G7 The New York Stock Exchange requires, as con-
sideration for listing privileges, an agreement that investment trusts will
furnish their stockholders as well as the Stock Exchange with periodic
financial statements and other relevant information. 8 On the score of dis-
closure, therefore, it seems clear that machinery already exists for publicizing
the affairs of large interstate investment trusts, although additional affirmative
action by the states is probably necessary to compel disclosure in the case
of small intrastate companies. In both cases more detailed and more fre-
quent reports will be required, however, to satisfy the policy of regulation
by disclosure.
Although there is little dissent from a belief in the desirability and the
practicability of forcing adequate disclosure of information about the or-
ganization and management of investment trusts, there is a wide diversity
of opinion on the feasibility of undertaking active supervision of their man-
agement, either directly or by the enactment of rules and standards of con-
duct for the varied types of investment trusts. The question of whether there
is need for such regulation in addition to publicity, presents a difficult
problem, the answer to which will depend on how legislative authorities
63. Michigan, under rule 4 of the Securities Department, requires that all manage-
ment investment trusts quality as finance companies. They are thus subject to special
control. 131 C. C. H. Stocks and Bonds Law Serv. (1936) 2051; 'Micn. Com'r. Lws
(1929) §§ 12181-12197. A similar statute in Wisconsin was held not applicable to man-
agement investment trusts. Wisconsin Inv. Co. v. Skinner, 265 X. W. 631 (Wis. 1935).
64. 48 STAT. 892 (1934), 15 U. S. C. § 78e (1934).
65. 48 STAT. 894 (1934), 15 U. S. C. § 78m (1934).
66. 48 STAT. 895 (1934), 15 U. S. C. § 78o (1934), as amended 49 ST.%T. 1377 (1936),
15 U. S. C. § 78o (Supp. 1936).
67. 135 C. C. H. Stocks and Bonds Law Serv. (1936) 6S92.
68. Special agreements for investment trusts, New York Stock Exchange. See also
Statement on Investment Trusts by committee on stock list (1931).
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assess the position of investment trusts in the financial system and the choice
they make as to the direction in which the development of such organiza-
tions should be guided. The choice lies between two points of view. The
first regards investors as sufficiently protected if they are informed of the
management's financial interests in the concern; the second views invest-
ment trusts as so much like banking firms in function and so open to
managerial abuse when unregulated as to require a measure of detailed
supervision, by statutory rule and perhaps by inspection, comparable to the
regulation of the investment policy of banks and insurance companies. Dis-
closure alone could hardly prevent managers from retaining an unreason-
ably large share of control and the right to future profits. Charter powers
could still be unlimited and exculpatory clauses extensive. Moreover, sub-
sequent disclosure of management disloyalty is small consolation to stock-
holders who have no means of holding such managers to the standard of
fiduciaries. While it is true that the frequency with which this standard has
been disregarded is partly due to the cloak of secrecy surrounding managerial
conduct, 9 reasons inherent in the structural organization of the business tend
to permit managers to act disloyally with impunity.
Practically the sole means of enforcing the fiduciary standard has been
the stockholders' representative suit.70 While courts have recently stated that
managers of investment trusts would be held to higher standards than those
of commercial, private, or industrial corporations,7 1 the difficulties connected
with a stockholders' suit are numerous, even when stockholders have full
knowledge of the facts. Stockholders are widely scattered and unorganized ;72
litigation is expensive, and even if the defendants are solvent, satisfaction may
be of doubtful value ;73 procedural difficulties,7 4 ingenuity of the managers,
and uncertainty as to the unlawful kinds of misconduct also stand in the
way. 7 5 The result, therefore, may be that publicity alone will not assure that
investment trusts will be operated solely for the benefit of stockholders.70
Furthermore, as long as charter powers are unlimited and shareholders are
without control, publicity does not prevent the investment trust from being
69. See generally O'Connor v. First Nat. Investors' Corporation of Virginia, 163 Va.
908, 177 S. E. 852 (1935).
70. Dodd, Is Effective Enforcement of the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Managers
Practical. (1935) 2 U. oF CHI. L. REv. 194.
71. Goodwin v. Simpson, 197 N. E. 628 (Mass. 1935); O'Connor v. First Nat.
Investors' Corporation of Virginia, 163 Va. 908, 177 S. E. 852 (1935).
72. See Dresdner v. Goldman Sachs Trading Corp., 240 App. Div. 242, 245, 269 N. Y.
Supp. 360, 364 (2d Dep't 1934).
73. In Karasik v. Pacific Eastern Corporation, 180 Atl. 604 (Del. Ch. 1935),
the court upheld the settlement of $300,000, mostly in stock of the corporation itself, of
the $1,000,000 suit against the directors of the Goldman Sachs Trading Corporation.
74. Gerith Realty Corporation v. Normandie Nat. Securities Corp., 154 Misc. 615,
276 N. Y. Supp. 655 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
75. Dodd, loc. cit. supra note 70.
76. Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct (1934) 47 HARV. L. REv. 1305, 1324.
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used for purposes other than the investment of funds. Its assets can be
used for speculation, to control other enterprises, or for other purposes which,
although within charter powers, are contrary to the original purposes held
out to induce investment by the public.7 7 Finally, publicity in itself does
not prevent the failure of an investment trust any more than bank exam-
inations prevent insolvencies of banks. Nevertheless, adequate information
in the hands of enlightened and litigious investors or their competent advisers
might have a powerful indirect effect, and many investment trust managers
feel that this alone would control the abuses. 8 Without a test during a
complete business cycle, it seems impossible to judge in advance the effective-
ness of publicity as regulation; whether disclosure should be regarded as
enough will be one of the most difficult decisions involved in framing future
legislation.
Possible regulation in addition to enforced disclosure should have two
aims. It should provide that the operation of the investment trust will be
strictly for the benefit of those shareholders who supply the funds. Secondly,
it should attempt to minimize the chance of failure and consequent loss to
investors. Regulation for the first purpose can be accomplished in several
ways. The most drastic and perhaps most promising statutory rule would
be a prohibition against non-voting stock, stock of more than one class, and
compensation to promoters in the form of stock.70 By these three prohibi-
tions theoretical control would be left in the hands of those who contribute
the capital and not in the hands of managers, who, holding a limited stake
in the enterprise, might find it more profitable to deal with the assets for
their own personal benefit against the best interests of the contributors of
the capital. Existing legislation along this line seems to be limited to the
provisions in two state Blue-Sky regulations prohibiting promotion stock.P
Legislation would be relatively ineffective unless all three prohibitions were
combined. For example, promoters could purchase the entire issue of no
par voting common stock for a nominal consideration and issue non voting
preferred stock to the public.81 In this way, with a limited contribution
promoters could control the investment trust.
The disadvantages of such legislation would lie in the necessity for reor-
ganizing the capital structure of existing trusts and, more important, a
prohibition against the use of preferred stocks. The purpose of preferred
stock in investment trusts has been twofold: to offer to the public a security
77. In People v. Latta, 137 Misc. 203, 244 N. Y. Supp. 487 (Sup. Ct. 1930) an in-
junction -was granted under the Martin Act partly because of the failure of the invest-
ment trust to carry out its advertised purposes.
78. See note 56, supra.
79. Shaviro, loc. cit. supra note 18.
80. Alabama and California 131 C. C. H. Stocks and Bonds Law Serv. (1936) 163,
465.
81. This was done in People v. Latta, 137 Misc. 208, 244 N. Y. Supp. 437 (Sup. Ct.
1930).
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of limited risk and to make the common stock more attractive through the
possibility of increasing its earning and liquidating value by means of the
leverage afforded to the common shares .'I' Thus managers holding a sub-
stantial investment in common stock have the incentive, because of the
leverage, to promote the best interests of the trust, for a substantial increase
in earnings and asset value will inure to their benefit: conversely a sub-
stantial decline will in the first instance adversely affect the common stock.
8 3
A possible means of preventing control from falling to those without a sub-
stantial investment in the enterprise and at the same time permitting the
use of preferred stock might be to limit the common stock to par value equal
to that of voting preferred. In this way majority control and majority
investment would go along together, and it would be more difficult for the
management, holding one class of securities, to have an interest as security
holders in conflict with the interests of the mass of investors in the trust.
Even where there is a concurrence of financial contribution and control
such as might be required by this kind of regulation of capital structures, it
seems reasonable to contemplate a clash of interest between management
and the security holders at large based not on the managemenCs control
of a special class of security, but on the availability to it, as management,
of other sources of special profit. In view of this diversity of interest between
management and investors, a statute regulating investment trusts might
treat shareholders of investment trusts not simply as co-owners of the en-
terprise but in the same category as depositors in savings banks or policy
holders in life insurance companies. Provision might then be made for
means other than stoclkholder's suits to enforce fiduciary duty on the part
of managers. Such legislation might prohibit purchases and sales of securities
and loans of cash or securities between managers and the investment trust
in the same way that transactions between banks and their executive officers
are regulated by the Federal Reserve Act84 and the Banking Act of 1933.83
Michigan, whose Blue-Sky regulations qualify investment trusts as finance
companies, prohibits such transactions between managers and the invest-
ment trust.8 0 Legislation of this type would of course render invalid broad
provisions absolving managers from liability for breach of their fiduciary
duty, although it is questionable whether such exculpatory clauses are legally
operative even in the absence of legislation.
7
Other proposed legislation, addressed to the problems presented by the
divorce of ownership and control, implicit in the investment trust device,
82. MONTGOMERY, FINANcIAL HANDBOOK (2d ed. 1933) 1245.
83. Record, United States and Foreign Securities Corp. (Feb. 12, 1937) 11722.
84. 38 STAT. 272 (1913), 12 U. S. C. § 375 (1934).
85. 48 STAT. 182 (1933), 12 U. S. C. § 375a (1934).
86. See note 63, supra.
87. See Whalen v. Hudson Hotel Co., 183 App. Div. 316, 320, 170 N. Y. Supp. 855,
858 (3d Dep't 1918).
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would go further in enforcing fiduciary duties upon management by pre-
venting situations out of which arise temptations to operate the trust for per-
sonal benefit. This legislation would segregate investment trust management
from investment banking firms, brokerage houses and other affiliations on
the theory that a combination of these functions gives rise to conflicts of
interest which are likely to be resolved against the trust.8m Regulation of
this type is similar to the segregation of commercial banks from investment
affiliates under the Banking Act of 1933,89 and to the proposed segregation
of brokers and dealers under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 0 Segre-
gation is a drastic remedy, and recently the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission refrained from recommending the segregation of brokers and dealers
on the ground that it was not feasible at the moment.91 Segregation in the case
of investment trusts should be employed with equal caution,0 2 and the ques-
tion of whether it is necessary at all is one of the key problems of policy
facing the framers of a statute. When provision was made for the segrega-
tion of banks from investment affiliates in the Banking Act of 1933, the
affiliates had not been subjected to examination or regulation by either federal
or state authorities, and affiliates were so generally unpopular that the dis-
cussion turned on how the divorce should be effected rather than its desir-
ability.93 Comparable conditions of scandal and abuse bear on the problem
of segregating investment trusts from investment banking firms and broker-
age houses.
The segregation of financial functions is justifiable only when these func-
tions are in substantial conflict. The selling of securities by investment
bankers does conflict with careful and unbiased purchasing of securities by
investment trusts controlled by those bankers. However, there are other
functions of both investment trusts and investment banks which are parallel,
and in these the relationship of the banking house to the investment trust
would appear to be valuable. For example, investment banks furnish long
experience in handling substantial amounts of capital; they provide practical
experience in appraising companies and industries; and they can supply to
the investment trusts useful information which they obtain from their in-
dustrial and financial associations.0 4 Brokerage houses may supply some of
the sen-ices of investment banks but their aid is limited, since their necessary
concentration on brokerage fees must inevitably conflict with the function
88. Shaviro, loc. cit. supra note 18.
89. 48 STAT. 188 (1933), 12 U. S. C. §377 (1934).
90. 48 STAT. 891 (1934), 15 U. S. C. § 78k (1934).
91. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE CommzsszoN , REr-orn ON THE- FEsmLr. TY A= AD-
VISABILITY OF THE COMPLETE SEGREGATION OF THE Fu.xcrozs oF DsALin AND BrnOnr
(1936).
92. Record, General American Investors Co. (Nov. 12, 1936) 5844.
93. Westerfield, The Banking Act of '933 (1933) 41 J. or PoL Ecoxn. 721, 739.
94. See statement of Mr. Lehman, Record, Lehman Corp. (Nov. 10, 1936) 5643.
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of investment trusts of disinterested shifting of investments. As a solution, ° 5
the New York Stock Exchange has recommended independent directors for
investment trusts controlled by banking houses. Perhaps definite prohibi-
tions against transactions between investment trusts and their financial affili-
ates might be justified. But it would seem questionable whether wholesale
segregation is either feasible or desirable, particularly without consideration
of the efficacy of publicity and other less drastic regulation.
Another type of regulation assumes that control and ownership are separ-
ated, and would indirectly give control to the suppliers of funds by making
all trusts open-end so as to provide for all shareholders the right to redeem
their stock and receive a pro rata share of assets at any time.9 The Revenue
Act of 1936 is designed to induce investment trusts to mutualize and grant
these redemptive privileges by allowing certain exemptions from taxation to
trusts of this type.07 Mutualization would necessitate the reorganization of
existing trusts and place a limitation on the use of securities of more than
one class.9 8 Senior securities could not be used unless some arrangement
were devised whereby junior security holders could redeem and at the same
time have sufficient senior securities called to maintain the protection of the
senior securities. 9 A more serious problem is raised by the tendency to
liquidate during times of business depression. Since a preference for cash
or highly liquid holdings is characteristic of periods of falling prices, security
holders might redeem in large numbers just at the time when security prices
were low and the necessary liquidation on the part of the open-end trusts
would aggravate the deflation of security prices.'00  This tendency would
95. New York Stock Exchange Committee on Stock List, Statement on Investment
Trusts (1931). § 2 of c. 14 of the rules adopted by the Governing Committee of the
New York stock exchange was amended on May 7, 1931, to read: "No member or firm
registered on the exchange shall be associated with an investment trust, whether manage-
ment, restricted management or fixed type, either by participating in its organization or
management or by offering or distributing its securities, unless the Committee on Stock
List shall have previously determined that it has no objection to such association and
shall not have changed such determination."
96. Shaviro, loc. cit. supra note 18.
97. 49 STAT. 1669 (1936), 26 U. S. C. § 48 (Supp. 1936); 49 STAT. 1655 (1936),
26 U. S. C. A. § 13 (Supp. 1936). Under these provisions, if a mutual investment trust
passes on to its stockholders the net income received, including net capital gains from
the sale of securities, it is relieved from the regular corporation and surplus tax. This is
accomplished by permitting such a company to deduct the total dividends received by
it in computing its net income instead of the usual 85% of the dividends received.
98. A plan for mutualization of National Investors Corporation has been presented
to stockholders. N. Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1936, p. 41, col. 6.
99. Shaviro, loc. cit. supra note 18.
100. This would be similar to the withdrawal of savings deposits during a serious
depression. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES (Dep't of Commerce
1936) 252.
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make it impossible for trusts to practice the frequently asserted policy of
investment of purchasing securities when prices were low.' 0 I
Some of the proposed regulation of investment trusts is aimed at mini-
mizing the chance of failure rather than at the enforcement of the fiduciary
duty of managers. Regulation of this type, similar to that imposed upon
savings banks and insurance companies, 0 2 would attempt to codify certain
standard practices of conservative management. For example, it would limit
the power of the trust to borrow money' 0 3 and to speculate, 10 and would
limit the compensation of managers. 0° It would require a certain amount
of diversification of investments by establishing a maximum percent of the
stock in a single company that an investment trust could hold and by fixing
the maximum percentage of assets of the investment trust that could be
invested in any one company.10
Further regulation might also prohibit the participation by investment
trusts in the underwriting of security issues in order to avoid the risk
involved. If such participation were prohibited, it would be the third time
in thirty years that underwriting privileges have been denied to financial
institutions. Insurance companies were prohibited from underwriting in
1909,107 and commercial banks, through divorce of investment affiliates, in
1933.10s While in each case the primary reason for segregation was the
great risk which underwriting involved for a financial institution engaged
in handling the funds of investors, there was also the secondary reason of
the possibility of abuse, 00 and on each occasion the abuses were brought
about largely because of the lack of disclosure." 0
While investment trusts are too new to have a single accepted place in
the financial system, it seems clear from the experience of England and
America that they can only be considered as a sound media for investment
when they are conservatively managed. It is merely superficially inconsistent
to permit an individual to speculate with his own money, and at the same
time to limit his right to entrust his funds to the discretion of others for
101. ROBINSON, op. cit. supra note 3, at 258.
102. See, for example, limitations placed upon the investments of life insurance com-
panies. N. Y. INs. LAW § 100 and those placed upon the investments of savings banks,
N. Y. BANKING LAW § 239.
103. Shaviro, loc. cit. supra note 18. See RonixsoN, op. cit. mLpra note 3, at 163 for
the advantages and disadvantages of borrowing by investment trusts.
104. Perhaps by establishing "legal" investments. See note 102, jupra.
105. Shaviro, loc. cit. supra, note 18.
106. In order to qualify as a mutual investment trust under the Revenue Act of
1936, similar diversification is necessary. 49 ST.AT. 1669 (1936), 26 U. S. C. §48 (Supp.
1936).
107. N. Y. INs. LAW § 100.
108. 48 STAT. 188 (1933), 12 U. S. C. § 377 (1934).
109. REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE AND AssEMBnLY OF N. Y. o!.
LIFE INsURANCE ComPAxlEs (1906) 276; SEN. REPr. op. cit. sipra note 23, at 163.
110. Ibid; Westerfield, loc. cit. stepra note 93.
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the same speculation. It seems accepted in business opinion that investment
trusts should be allowed a considerable latitude in their choice of investment
policy, so long as that policy is not concealed from prospective purchasers
of the trust's securities; but losses have been so severe in several classes
of investment trusts that some limitations on managerial discretion appear
inevitable.
Legislation to minimize the risk of failure is necessarily restrictive and
tends to standardize."' The imposition of such standards upon investment
trusts is difficult because so far, at least, investment trusts have been as
varied as the ingenuity of their sponsors. Some are formed for the purpose
of taking highly speculative risks in the hope of large returns; others are
conservative. It is impossible to mold them into one type of institution with-
out destroying their ability to operate for diverse purposes. Investment trusts
resemble savings banks and insurance companies for the purposes of restric-
tive legislation only when control and ownership are divorced. Where the
contributors of capital can direct the destiny of the trust, it is similar to a
joint enterprise and should not be restricted as to purpose, whether it be to
speculate wildly or to invest conservatively. Furthermore, to restrict the
freedom of management gives rise to the same inflexibility and inability to
meet continually changing conditions that is the inherent weakness of fixed
investment trusts.
To summarize briefly, the first problem in framing further legislation is
to determine the effectiveness of disclosure as a remedy for the abuses of
investment trusts. By assuming that investors have become more cautious
since the halcyon days of 1929 and are aware of the dangers inherent in
allowing the control of investment trusts to fall into the hands of those who
do not have a substantial pecuniary interest, and by assuming that publicity
will deter management from breaching their fiduciary duty, disclosure would
seem to be sufficient regulation. If, through experience, such assumptions
prove incorrect, regulation of the capital structures of newly formed trusts
appears necessary for the purpose of preventing contributors of capital from
being deprived of control; and in the case of trusts already formed, where
such deprivation of control exists, regulation to enforce fiduciary duty by
prohibiting managers from dealing with the trust either directly or indirectly
seems desirable. To go further and attempt directly to minimize the chance
of failure by fixing standards for all trusts would not only restrict the use
of investment trusts, but would give investors the misleading impression
that regulation leads inevitably to successful operation -which in the last
analysis depends upon honest and competent management acting with the
incentive furnished by a substantial stake in the enterprise.
111. ROBINSON, op. cit. supra note 3, at 286.
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